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THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the t al court erred when it ruled that 
the state statutory exemption for payment of overtime 
wages, which is restri in scope to "laborers 
engaged in agriculture and farming on a farm," G. L . 
c. 151, § 1A[19], includes employees at an indoor bean 
sprout lity who are engaged solely in food 
ssing and not any way with cultivat 
growing, or harvesting . 
INTEREST OF THE AMICI 
The ami are American Civil Liberties Union 
of Mass setts ("ACLUM"), the Labor Re ions and 
Research Center, University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
("Labor Center"), the Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute ("MLRI"), the Pioneer Valley Workers Center 
("PVWC"), United Food and Commercial Workers Local 
1459 ("UFCW 1459"), and Professor Mi l Wishnie, 
Yale Law School . 
The American l L ies Union of 
Massachusetts is an af liate of the national 
ACLU. Among the rights ACLUM de through direct 
representation and as an amicus are workers' rights to 
due process and equal protection. E.g., Messing, 
1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Rudavsky and iky v. Pres. & lows Harvard 
College, 436 Mass. 347 (2002) (workers' ri to 
information in employment discrimination cases) . 
ACLUM's interest is longstanding as evidenced by s 
cus participation in ida Cigar Corp. v. 
Dept. of Public Heal , 372 Mass. 844, 844 (1977), a 
added sect 1A(19) to Chapter 151, the statute at 
issue here (in the context access to migrant farm 
labor camps) . 
The Labor Relations and Research Center at the 
Un sity Massachusetts (Amherst) is an integrated 
program of graduate education, research, direct 
s ce to workers and the labor movement. Its 
re and educati mission address the rise of 
inequality that accompanied rapid growth of 
low-wage, non-standard and contingent employment. The 
Center provi s labor organizations and government 
policy-makers wi fact-driven research evaluating the 
social, economic and techno cal forces dr ng 
changes in 1 markets and relations. 
The Massachusetts Law Reform Institute is a 
statewide non-profit law and poverty center. Its 
mission is to advance economic, social and racial 
2 
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justice for low-income sons and communities. For 
fifty years, MLRI s engaged in l slat 
administrat and judicial advocacy on behalf of its 
clients and as part of that advocacy has participated 
as amicus curiae numerous appellate cases 
concerning oyment. MLRI a strong interest in 
ensur that state's employment statutes, 
including G.L. c. 151, be lied in a manner 
consistent th the public policy set forth in section 
1 of chapter, that no worker in the Commonwealth 
should be employed at a wage that is "oppressive and 
unreasonable." 
The Pioneer Valley Workers Center's ssion 
includes empowering low-wage workers to improve and 
defend their employment and labor rights. PVWC 
membe includes immigrant wor s employed in low-
jobs in the chain economy, e.g., labor, 
food processi and king, restaurant work and food 
services employment throughout oneer Valley. The 
PVWC provi s organizing and support activities for 
workers who experienced theft or 
discr nation in those jobs. 
UFCW Local 1459 is the largest union in western 
Massachusetts and an affiliate of the United Food and 
3 
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Corrunerc l Workers International Union IO) , 
compri of 1.3 llion members. Establi in 1938, 
UFCW 1459 approximately 5000 members and 
represents wor rs at Stop & Shop grocery chain, 
f food cooperat s, and other l food sellers 
and producers. UFCW 1459's mission includes securing 
enforcement of federal state wage and hour laws in 
Pioneer Valley's low-wage labor markets, with a 
particular s on food economy, the 
agricultural sector to food processing and retail 
establishments . 
Michael J. Wishn is the William 0. Douglas 
Clini Professor of Law and Counselor to the Dean at 
Ya Law School (institut affiliation r 
identi cat only). He co-directs Ya 's Worker & 
Irrunigrant Rights Advocacy Clinic, and his scholarship 
addres labor and employment issues spe f ic to 
low-wage and irrunigrant workers. Wishn is a former 
co-chair of the ABA Labor and Employment Section's 
Corrunittee on Irruni ion (1998-2003), and a former 
member of the ABA Coordinating Committee on 
Irrunigration (representing the Section on Labor & 
Employment) (1998-2002). He has trained attorneys in 
4 
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the Boston Regional Of ce of U.S. Department of 
Labor, f ice of Solicitor of Labor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ami adopt Statement of Case as 
sented by the ainti -Appellants ("Chang 
wo rs" or "Chang employees") and note the following: 
I. The facili 
Chang, an indoor facility roughly the area of a 
football field, 44,000 square feet, uses seventeen 
percent of its ce to hydroponically grow and 
harvest mung and bean sprouts. Record Appendix 
(hereafter "R.A.") I, 110, 120; R.A. III 32, 160. In 
the eighty-three rcent, Chang workers 
l in cavernous processing and production rooms, 
preparing sprouts for market . 
ir jobs include cleaning sprouts as well 
as weighing, sorting and packaging in plastic 
bags. The workers then place f ini product on 
pallets r short-term storage in two refrigerated, 
walk-in coo rs. From there, the packaged bean sprouts 
are moved on pallets to the indoor shipping and 
receiving docks. The facility also contains an 
employee break area and office space. R.A. I 120 . 
5 
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entire facility is temperature-controll 
cause sprouts are parti rly susceptible to food-
borne illness outbreaks, chiefly from Lysteria Mono-
cytogenes. R.A. II at 40. The Chang workers are 
prohibited from entering grow rooms, s fed by 
two or three other oyees, for fear of mi al 
contamination of the sprout seeds. R.A. II 172 . 
Computer-controll systems fertilize and monitor the 
bean sprouts during the five-day growing cycle. R.A. I 
103 . 
The Chang lity is not a seasonal ration. 
Rather, beans sprouts are grown, harvested and then 
process six days a week, fifteen hours each day for 
twelve months a . R.A. II 9. Chang produces 
280,000 pounds of sprouts weekly. R.A. II at 24. The 
Chang employees l routinely work significant 
overtime . ir workweek can extend up to 70 hours. 
R.A. I 57; R.A. III 160 . 
The Massachusetts Department of Public Health 
(DPH) licenses Chang's facility as a food processing 
plant. R.A. I 127. The Town of Whately, where Chang is 
located, simila y classi es Chang as a food 
processing ility. R.A.I at 125 (Certificate of 
Occupancy) . 
6 
• • • • • :. I. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
II. The rior Court's Decision 
Ten Chang Farm empl s who worked in excess 
hours week cleaning, sorting and packaging 
bean sprouts filed this suit iming they were 
illegally denied overtime wages required by G.L. c . 
151, § lA. Defendant Chang and Son Enterprises in 
response claimed that it did not have to pay overt 
to these loyees because G.L. c. 151, § 1A(19) 
exempts from the state overtime pay irement 
"laborers engaged in culture farming on a 
rm." 
On cross motions for summary judgment, trial 
court ruled for the employer, hol ng that these 
workers were subject to the agricultural overtime 
exemption even though they are not engaged in 
cultivation, growing or harvesting . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
is case brings into sha focus the difference 
between the federal and Massachusetts laws governing 
ir re ive overtime exemptions r agricultural 
workers. Brief ("Br.") 13-16, 21 2 . 
The federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
ires employers covered the Act to pay time and 
a half to employees for time worked over forty hours 
7 
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in a week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). FLSA contains an 
express exemption from this requirement for workers 
engaged in iculture and de nes " iculturen 
expans ly to include owers, anters and pie rs, 
referred to as primary agricultural labor, as well as 
any other performed incidental to or in 
conjunction wi farming operations, referred to as 
By contrast, agricultural exemption in the 
Massachusetts overtime statute, G.L. c. 151, § 1A(19), 
is signi cantly more rest ctive. It denies overt 
pay only if a laborer is "engaged in iculture and 
farming on a farm.n (emphasis added). The 
Massachusetts exemption, by its language and purpose, 
departs from FLSA and excludes from overtime 
protection a far narrower class of emp s. It s 
not excl workers engaged in food cess and 
packaging, as the Chang workers are. Br. 11-16, 21-22 . 
The court low f ai to narrowly construe 
Massachusetts agr tural exemption as a al law 
intended to nefit Massachusetts workers. Br.15-17 . 
It ignored tenets of statutory construction by 
de ning two distinct statutory terms in § 1A(19) -
"agriculturen and "farming" - as being essentially 
8 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
synonymous, and, in ion, ignored conjunction 
"and" that joins se two terms. The conjunction 
"and" establishes a two-part test to rmine if a 
laborer falls under the agricultural exemption: 
employee must be engaged in both " culture" and 
\\ ng on a farm." The Chang workers are not farming 
on a Br.17-20. 
There was an additional statutory construction 
error. The lower court improperly infu federal law 
into state exemption notwithstanding 
slature's rejection of FLSA's language. Br.21-25 . 
Other Massachusetts statutes incorporate FLSA's broad 
definition of culture to al those particular 
state laws with FLSA's de tion of agriculture. In 
G.L. c. 151, the Legislature rejected t s approach . 
Br. 27 28 . 
An analysis of the work performed demonstrates 
that Chang empl s are not engaged in "fa ng 
on a farm," and refore not excluded from overt 
by G.L. c. 151, § (19). This conclusion is 
supported by governmental determinations that 
Chang enterprise is a food process facil y and not 
a . Br. 28-32. 
9 
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Finally, by construing the Massachusetts 
agricultural exemption broadly and without 
consideration of its remedial purpose, the trial court 
ruling exposes a vulnerable section of the state's 
workforce to exploitation. Br. 33-35 . 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
At issue is the scope of the Massachusetts 
agricultural exemption, subsection 19 of G.L. c. 151, 
§ lA, one of twenty provisos in the statute that 
excludes certain classes of workers from the 
requirement of overtime pay (time and a half the 
hourly rate). Section 1A(19) exempts an employer from 
paying the overtime rate when "a laborer [is] engaged 
in agriculture and farming on a farm." The terms, 
purpose, and context of the state agricultural 
exemption does not permit the Chang Farm to deny 
overtime to the employees who initiated this wage and 
hour claim . 
Chapter 151, § lA is a remedial law. Its purpose 
is to provide overtime protection to workers who are 
not covered by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. See Swift v . 
10 
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AutoZone, Inc. , 4 4 1 Mass . 4 4 3 , 4 4 8 - 4 9 ( 2 0 0 4 ) . 
Accordingly, the twenty provisos to G.L. c. 151, § lA 
are to be construed narrowly to effectuate the overall 
purpose of the statute. See Lexington Educ. Assoc. v . 
Town of Lexington, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 749, 752-53 
(1983) (proviso to be strictly construed when excising 
a discrete group of employees from a remedial law's 
protection); Mullally v. Waste Mgmt. of Mass., Inc., 
452 Mass. 526, 531 (2008) (purpose of G.L. c. 151, 
§ lA is "to reduce the number of hours worked, 
encourage the employment of more persons, and 
compensate employees for the burden of a long 
workweek") . 
I. UNDER A PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF CHAPTER 151, 
§ 1A(19), THE CHANG WORKERS ARE NOT ENGAGED 
IN "FARMING ON A FARM" AND THUS ARE ENTITLED TO 
OVERTIME PAY . 
The federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
enacted in 1938, exempts from its overtime protections 
"any employee employed in agriculture," 29 U.S.C. § 
213 (a) (6). (emphasis added). FLSA defines agriculture 
expansively to include, "farming in all its branches," 
29 U.S.C. § 203(f), including "the cultivation and 
tillage of the soil," as well as "any practices [ ... ] 
performed by a farmer or on a farm as incident to or 
11 
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in conjunction with such farming operations, including 
preparation for market, delivery to storage or to 
market or to carriers for transportation to market." 
Id. FLSA's broad agricultural overtime exemption 
undeniably applies to the Chang workers . 
By its terms and legislative design, the 
Massachusetts overtime provision, G.L. c. 151, § lA, 
intentionally departs from FLSA, extending overtime 
protection to workers not covered by the federal law . 
See Swift, 441 Mass. 443, 448-49 (2004). The 
Massachusetts agricultural exemption, G.L. c. 151, 
§ 1A(19), unlike the federal law, does not exclude all 
laborers in the agricultural sector . 
In order to deny an employee overtime pay 
pursuant to the § 1A(19) exemption, the employer must 
prove three facts: that an employee is 1) engaged in 
"agriculture" and 2) is also engaged in "farming"; 3) 
that takes place "on a farm." Chang fails to meet 
these statutory criteria. Goodrow v. Lane Bryant, 
Inc., 432 Mass. 165, 170 (2000) (party claiming 
exemption from statutory provision bears the burden of 
showing entitlement to exemption) . 
12 
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A. The purpose context of r 151, 
§ 1A(19) demonstrate it is a remedial 
statute intended to protect workers excluded 
overtime by fede law's expans 
cultural ove exemption 
Chapter 151, § lA, rst enacted in 1946, belongs 
to a body of remedial law that has sed floor 
protections. 1 se laws include: a higher minimum 
wage, G.L. c. 151, § 1 ($11.00/hour currently and 
always 50 cents higher than federal minimum); a 
more protective standard to address misclassifying 
workers, G.L. c. 149, § 14 (creat strong 
presumption empl rather than independent 
contractor status); and equi and t rency, 
G.L c. 149, § 10 (broaden def tion of 
'comparable work' and banning retaliation for 
1 Notable early twentieth legislation includes: 
Massachusetts becoming the first state to enact a minimum 
wage law to protect women and children. See Act of June 4, 
1912, c. 706, 1912 Mass. Acts 780. In 1946, two decades 
before the enactment of Title VII, racial discrimination in 
employment was outlawed by the Fair Employment Practice 
Act. See History of the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination, http://www.mass.gov/mcad/about/mcad-
his .html (last accessed June 21, 2018). Now codified as 
G.L. c. 151B, this law has broad scope, adding gender in 
1965 and disability and sexual orientation in 1984 and 1989 
respectively. Id. In 2010, c. 151B, § 4(9~) banned 
employers' improper use of applicant and emp criminal 
history. The Legislature in October 2018 strengthened this 
protection by decreas time limits for mandatory 
disclosure to employers of misdemeanor convictions. Senate 
Bill No. 2371. 
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disclosure of wage to coworkers, effective July 1, 
2018) . 
Chapter 151, § 1A(l9) was enacted in 1967 as part 
of a series of legislative measures to "insulate 
farmworkers from potential exploitation." Consolidated 
Cigar Corp. v. Dept. of Public Health, 372 Mass. 844, 
849 (1977) . 2 The purpose of these statutes was to 
address the "absence of federal or state protections 
[that] seems destined to [subject farmworkers] to 
a continual life of poverty and deprivation." 1967 
Senate Doc. No. 1303 . 
Under this package of legislative reforms the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health was 
authorized to inspect migrant farm labor camps to 
ensure workers had educational and recreational 
opportunities, freedom of movement, and visitation 
rights. This oversight sought to combat the 
oppression and exploitation experienced by farmworkers 
who historically were subject to farm employers' 
"company town" mentality. G.L. c. 111, § 128H; 105 
C.M.R 420 (farm labor camp sanitary code) . 
2 It was only in 1966 that some farmworkers were included 
FLSA, providing a $1.00 per hour minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206 . 
14 
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At that historic moment the Legislature 
established for the first time a minimum wage for farm 
labor, G.L. c. 151, § 2A ($1.30 per hour and 30 cents 
higher than the federal minimum), a definition of 
"agricultural and farm work," G.L. c. 151, §2, and the 
overtime exemption that excludes only those 
"laborer[s] engaged in agriculture and farming on a 
fa rm. " G . L . c . 151 , § 1 A ( 1 9 ) . 3 
The agricultural overtime exemption in G.L. c . 
151, § 1A(19) should be construed in this context, 
i.e., as part of a remedial statutory scheme with the 
overall purpose of protecting Massachusetts workers 
who remain vulnerable to the "burden of a long work 
week" as a result of the shortfalls of federal law . 
See Mullally, 452 Mass. 526, 531 (2008); DiFiore v . 
American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 490 (2009) 
(statute to be construed in light of legislative 
intent to avoid "the mischief or imperfection to be 
3 Notably, Massachusetts enacted these laws in the midst of 
the historic nationwide grape boycott led by the United 
Farm Workers Union and its president, Cesar Chavez, See 
Steven Roberts, 26 Grape Growers Sign Union Accord Boycott 
Nears End, NYT, July 30, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com 
/1970/07/30/archives/26-grape-growers-sign-union-accord-
boycott-nears-end-26-grape.html (last accessed June 23, 
2018); Frank Bardacke, Trampling Out the Vintage: Cesar 
Chavez and the Two Souls of the United Farm Workers, 261-
307 (Verso 2017),and not long after the massive civil 
rights that ushered into law the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
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remedied" and to achieve the "main object to be 
accomplished") . 
B. The trial court misread the plain 
language of the Massachusetts agricultural 
exemption by failing to distinguish between 
employees who are engaged in "agriculture" 
but not engaged in "farming on a farm." 
As a proviso the agricultural exemption in G.L . 
c. 151, § lA is to be construed strictly "within the 
words as well as within the reason" of the statute and 
its overall purpose. Woods v. Exec. Office of Cmtys . 
and Dev. , 411 Mass . 5 9 9 , 6 0 5 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ( strictly 
construing proviso in housing voucher program to favor 
assistance for low income tenants) . The lower court 
here disregarded the statutory text and these 
principles of strict construction . 
1. The trial court erred by defining the 
phrase "agriculture and farming on a farm" 
without considering the definitions in 
Chapter 151 . 
The trial court failed to consider G.L. c. 151, 
§ 2, the "Definitions" that govern Chapter 151 . 
Goodrow, 432 Mass. at 170 (before turning to common 
usage to construe statutory terms, courts look to 
whether statute defines the term) . Section 2 defines 
the phrase "agricultural and farm work," as "labor on 
a farm and the growing and harvesting of agricultural, 
16 
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floricultural and horticultural commodities." This 
phrase, while somewhat different from the text of 
§ 1A(19), is instructive in understanding what the 
Legislature meant by the phrase key phrase 
"agriculture and farming on a farm" in § 1A(19) . 
Notably, the definition of "agricultural and farm 
work" provided by Section 2 does not support the 
conclusion reached by the trial court, i.e., that the 
Chang workers are denied overtime because they are 
engaged in "agriculture and farming on a farm." To 
the contrary, the definition in Section 2 of 
"agricultural and farm work" is decidedly narrow, 
including only the "growing and harvesting" activities 
performed by farm labor . 
There is no indication that the definition 
includes the exclusively post-harvesting work 
performed by the Chang workers of sorting, cleaning 
and packaging bean sprouts, doing so in a separate 
part of the facility segregated from the grow rooms 
where the sprouts are planted, grown and harvested . 
Thus, the relevant definition in Section 2, if viewed 
as essentially coterminous with the phrase 
"agriculture and farming on a farm," would not include 
the Chang workers because they are not laborers 
17 
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engaged in "growing and harvesting" agricultural 
commodities . 
2. The trial court's definition of 
"agriculture and farming on a farm" 
did not provide each term with a separate 
and distinct meaning . 
The trial court made two additional and 
interrelated errors of statutory construction. First, 
the court failed to ascribe separate and distinct 
meanings to the terms "agriculture," "farming," and 
"on a farm." Second, the court incorrectly treated as 
surplusage the conjunction "and" that joins the term 
"agriculture" with the phrase "farming on a farm." 
The lower Court defined the terms "agriculture" 
and "farming" as being synonymous notwithstanding 
that, by their ordinary and approved usage, 
agriculture denotes a far wider ranger of economic 
activities than does farming. See Bolster v. Comm. of 
Corps and Taxation, 319 Mass. 81, 84 (1946) (statutory 
phrasing negates possibility Legislature intended 
terms "annuity" and "life estate" to be used inter-
changeably) . 
The trial court correctly defined "agriculture" 
expansively, relying on the definition of 
"agriculture" from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (11th 
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ed. 2005), as the "science, art or practice of 
cultivating the soil, producing crops, and raising 
livestock and in varying degrees the preparation and 
marketing of the resulting products." R.A. III 166 
(emphasis added) . 
The trial court's definition of "farming," which 
is a subset of agriculture, inexplicably was equally 
expansive. The court wrote that "working on a farm 
(i.e. to be 'farming')" includes "everything from 
planning the crop, selecting the seeds, operating 
complex machinery, deciding when and how much to 
plant, fertilizing, growing, harvesting, transporting 
the harvested crops to a central location, and 
preparing the crops for distribution and everything in 
between." R.A. III 167 (emphasis added) . 
The court concluded that the two core terms in 
§ 1A(19) - "agriculture" and "farming" were both 
"broad, and intentionally so" and drew no meaningful 
distinction between them. R.A. III 167. Tellingly, the 
trial court's definition of "farming" referenced no 
state or federal law or regulation or any secondary 
source. See Woods, 411 Mass. at 604 (rejecting 
interpretation of federal statute authorizing remedial 
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housing vouchers because there was "no practical 
difference" between two distinct statutory terms) . 
This failure to draw a distinction between the 
conjunctively joined terms "agriculture" and "farming" 
creates an illogical tautology in G.L. c. 151, § lA at 
odds with the rule of construction requiring that each 
term in a statute be given full effect and that no 
term be rendered "inoperative or superfluous". Souza 
v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 456 Mass. 594, 
601(2012). Under the lower court's interpretation, its 
finding that an employee is engaged in "agriculture," 
is the beginning and the end of the analysis. There is 
no need to prove the other element of the exemption, 
"farming on a farm," because, according to the trial 
court, "farming" encompasses virtually the same 
activities, i.e., "everything" from "planning the 
crop" to "preparing the crops for distribution and 
everything conceivable in between." R.A. III 167 . 
But this is not what the statute says. The 
statute makes clear that there are two elements, not 
one, required to satisfy the exemption: a laborer must 
be engaged in both "agriculture and farming on a 
farm." 
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There is no indication that the Legislature 
intended for the conjunction "and" in § 1A(l9) to be 
either ignored or repurposed as the disjunctive "or" . 
The Legislature did not provide employers with a menu 
of two options from which to choose in order to deny 
overtime wages to employees. Town of Somerset v . 
Dighton Water Dist., 347 Mass. 738, 743 (1964) (the 
word "and" in a statute should not be construed 
disjunctively unless it furthers a recognized 
legislative purpose); Swift, 441 Mass. at 448-49 
(overtime statute to be construed in light of its 
broad remedial purpose) . 
C. The trial court's over-broad construction of 
G.L. c. § 1A(l9) is improperly derived from 
FLSA . 
Massachusetts case law is clear that our courts 
are to depart from federal precedent when it is 
"dictated by some principle of Federal law not found 
in the law of Massachusetts." Vasys v. Metro Dist . 
Comm'n., 387 Mass. 51, 54 (1982). When the terms of a 
state statute differ in material respects from an 
otherwise analogous federal statute, it is to be 
inferred that the Legislature considered and rejected 
legal standards embodied or implied in the language of 
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the federal law. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston 
Retirement Ed., 388 Mass. 427, 432-433 (1983) . 
The trial court's ruling is at odds with this 
principle. It ignores the remedial purpose that state 
wage and hour laws serve, i.e., to provide protections 
for workers not covered by federal law. Goodrow, 432 
Mass. at 170-71 (FLSA does not preempt states from 
establishing more protective hours law) . 
The trial court's construction of§ 1A(19), while 
not a verbatim recitation of FLSA's broad agricultural 
overtime exemption, is remarkably close. Compare 29 
u.s.c. § 203(f), 
"Agriculture" includes farming in all its 
branches [ ... ] includ[ing] the cultivation 
and tillage of the soil, dairying, the 
production, cultivation, growing, and 
harvesting of any agricultural or 
horticultural commodities [ ... ] performed by 
a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or 
in conjunction with such farming operations, 
including preparation for market, delivery 
to storage or to market or to carriers for 
transportation to market . 
(emphasis added) with the trial court's 
conclusion that § 1A(19) exempts from overtime 
wage payment 
everything from planting the crop, selecting 
the seeds, operating complex machinery, 
deciding when and how to plant, fertilizing, 
growing, harvesting, transporting the 
harvested crops to a central location, and 
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preparing crops for dist ion and 
everything in between . 
R.A. III 167 (re ng to "farming"). 
The trial court took no note of the radically 
f rent texts of FLSA and§ 1A(19), a difference 
indicates the Massachusetts slature 
"considered and ected" FLSA's and all-
inc ive agri exemption. See Globe Newspaper 
Co., 388 Mass. at 432-433. The tri court in effect 
adopted wholesale broader s of the federal 
statute's agri exemption. s approach runs 
of Va sys, whi rects this state's courts to 
reject federal pre when "die by some 
inciple of l law not found the law of 
Massachusetts." 387 Mass. at 54 . 
I I. THE TERM "LABORER ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE AND 
FARMING ON A FARM," DOES NOT INCLUDE EMPLOYEES 
WHO EXCLUSIVELY WORK IN A POST-HARVEST FACTORY 
SETTING PROCESSING BEAN SPROUTS . 
A . Mass et ts denies overtime pay only 
laborers meet both prongs of the 
agricul overtime on . 
The trial court began its is by correctly 
stating that G.L. c . 151, § lA ( 19) s not align wi 
more expans ral overtime exemption for 
icultural wor rs, enacted as of FLSA in 1938 . 
29 U.S.C. § 203(f); see R.A. III 165. Congress 
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intended FLSA's express finit of agriculture to 
expansive, embracing "two distinct branches," 
ref erred to as primary agri ture and secondary 
agri ture. Farmers Reservoir & Irriga on Co. v . 
McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 762 (1949). See also 29 C.F.R . 
§780.128 (de ng primary culture) and 29 C.F.R. 
§ 780.129 (defining secondary agriculture) . 
Section 203(f) defines primary agriculture as 
"farming in all its branches" and expressly includes 
"the cultivat 
agricul 
Reservoir & gation Co., 337 U.S. at 762. FLSA's 
defini of secondary agriculture is expansive. It 
eludes "things r than farming," id., i.e . 
"practices luding forestry or lumbe ng 
ope rat s) performed by a farmer or on a as an 
incident to or in unction with ng rations, 
including preparation r market, del to storage 
or to market or to carriers for transportation to 
market." 29 U.S.C . 03(f); see Farmers Reservoir & 
Irri tion Co., 337 U.S. at 763 . 
As trial court recognized, the slature 
"purposefully" departed from federal law and se not 
to insert into§ 1A(19) FLSA's extremely broad 
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agricultural exemption that exempts workers engaged 
either primary agriculture, i.e., farming, "or" 
secondary culture4 • See R.A. III 165. Ins 
under Massachusetts law, the employer must show 
empl is "engaged agriculture" "and" engaged 
in rming on a farm." 
By rejecting the use of FLSA's expansive 
finition of agriculture in the text of§ 1A(19), 
Legislature chose not to deny overtime pay to workers 
who were engaged in secondary agriculture, i.e., 
activities incident to, or conjunction 
farming but who were not engaged in primary 
agriculture, i.e. "farmi on a rm. ff 
Indeed, nothing in the t al court's decision 
provides an anat based in policy or pr inc le 
for its ruling the Chang wor s were engaged in 
" rming on a farm." This lacuna is all the more 
perplexing given the trial court's expl t finding 
that the Legislature purposefully ected FLSA's 
sweeping finition of agriculture, which ssly 
encompasses work "performed by a farmer or on a 
4 In contrast to G.L. c. 151, § 1A(19), the federal 
agricultural exemption uses the term "or" to join the terms 
defining primary agriculture with the terms defining 
secondary agriculture, to create the expansive reach of the 
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as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming 
operations . ff 29 u.s.c. § 203 (f). 
The trial court offers no explanation for why, in 
its view, the Legislature, on the one hand, 
purposefully defined the Massachusetts agricultural 
exemption in terms that radically departed from the 
parallel FLSA provision and, on the other hand, 
intended a result identical to what would be required 
under the far more expansive FLSA exemption. See R.A . 
III 163-164 . 
The decision below creates the impression that 
the Legislature was aimlessly going around in circles 
when it enacted § 1A(19) and defies two governing 
principles of statutory construction: first, that 
exemptions are to be construed to avoid an "illogical 
result." Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 
801 (2018); AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. v . 
Barnstable, 477 Mass. 296, 301 (2017); and, second, 
that "[a]n intention to enact a barren and ineffective 
statutory provision is not lightly to be imputed to 
the Legislature." Neff v. Com. Ind. Accidents, 421 
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B • The slature did not intend for l s 
engaged in post-harvesting food processi 
to be ed overtime . 
In G.L. c. 151, §1A(l9), the Legislature ected 
the language in FLSA. In contrast, in statutes, 
Massachusetts Legislature has adopted or 
incorporate FLSA's broad definition of agriculture . 
This juxtapos ion supports the Chang workers' 
ition re . 
Consider, for example, G.L. c. 128, § lA, 5 the 
enabling statute for the state's Department of 
culture. This statute sely mirrors FLSA 
de tion of agriculture. Its FLSA-derived broad 
definition encompassing primary and secondary 
culture was subsequently used to define 
agriculture other Massachusetts laws where a broad 
"Farming or agriculture shall include farming in all of 
its branches and the cultivation and tillage of the soil, 
dai ng, the production, cultivation, growing and 
harvesting of any agricultural, aquacultural, floricultural 
or horticultural commodities, the growing and harvest of 
forest products upon forest land, the raising of livestock 
including horses, the keeping of horses as a commercial 
enterprise, the keeping and raising of poultry, swine, 
cattle and other domesticated animals used for food 
purposes, bees, fur-bear animals, and any forestry or 
lumbering operations, performed by a farmer, who is hereby 
defined as one engaged in agriculture or farming as herein 
defined, or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction 
with such operatioos, including preparations for 
market, del to storage or to market or to carriers for 
transportation to market." G.L. c. 128, § lA (added in 1952, 
c. 386) • 
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construction matches the legislative purpose. E.g . 
G.L. c. 7, § 23B (establishing preference for products 
grown in the Commonwealth; added by St. 2006, c. 123, 
§ 4); G.L. c. 40, § BL (establishing municipal 
agricultural commission; added in 2016, c. 218, § 23), 
and G.L. c. 40A, § 3 (prohibiting local zoning from 
regulating agricultural land, St. 1975, c. 808, § 3) . 
It is significant that these other statutes 
incorporate this expansive definition, each using the 
same phrase, "as defined in section lA of chapter 
128." (emphasis added). Had the Legislature wanted 
FLSA's broader agricultural exemption to also apply to 
the overtime statute, it would have included the same 
or similar language to effectuate that result, but it 
did not. Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 554 
(1996) (assuming that Legislature was aware of 
existing statutes when enacting subsequent laws) . 
C. Classification of Chang as a food processing 
facility supports these workers' claim to 
overtime . 
A finding that the Chang workers are not included 
within the § 1A(19) exemption is supported by state 
and local government determinations that have 
categorically rejected regulating the Chang facility 
as a farm. The Department of Public Health (DPH) has 
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classi ed and licensed the Chang facili as a 
process f acili . R.A. 127; G.L. c. 94, § 305C . 
s larly, Town Whately classi s the Chang 
f acili a factory for purposes of occupancy. R.A. I 
122-123, 127; 780 C.M.R. § 302.1 . 
These rminations matter. Like the test in 
Casseus, 478 Mass. at 795, they are based on the 
nature of the work performed in the ility and not 
on the physi proximity of growing and harvesting to 
the Chang Workers' post-harvesting labor. relevant 
regulations govern lities that weigh, package and 
process food; they do not regulate farms. R.A. I 127; 
R.A. III 37-38. The Chang workers' job ies are 
governed by the same DPH guidelines that regulate 
bread bakers and cucumber picklers who are entitled to 
overtime pay. This serves as another reason why 
wor rs are not subject to the agricultural 
exemption governing only laborers who are ~farming on 
a farm. " 6 
6 Pennsylvania mushroom workers employed in light and 
temperature sensitive indoor growing facilities are not 
considered exempt agricultural laborers under that state's 
labor relations statute. Blue Mt. Mushroom Co. v. Pa. Labor 
Relations Bd., 735 A.2d 742 (Comm. Pa. 1999). The court 
i the definition of agricultural labor relying 
on the General Safety Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 25-
1, which regulates wor s in facilities other 
than farms. The court concluded that employees working at 
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Processing and packaging of bean sprouts may fall 
under the broad finition of secondary agriculture, 
but the work of the Chang employees cannot reasonably 
on a farm." Workers engaged in secondary culture 
are excluded from overtime by FLSA, but speci cally 
not excluded due to the "farming on a farm" 
rement in the Massachusetts exemption. giving 
the phrase "farming on a farm" "no practical ef ct," 
the court failed to focus on the actual wo 
performed. Casseus, 478 Mass. at 801. Consequently, 
the al court arrived at a nding characterized by 
Casseus as an " surd outcome." 478 Mass. at 801 . 
The trial court rested s statutory 
interpretation on its ire to avoid creating "an 
artifi and potentially confusing line the sand 
for exemptions between actions taken to grow and 
harvest produce, and eaning and packaging it 
same; at the same location."(sic) R.A. III at 166 . 
But is nothing ttartificial" about deciding 
that growing and harvesting produce falls on one side 
mushroom growing facilities were not agricultural laborers 
because the state workplace sa law did not consider 
mushroom growing facilities to be farms. Blue Mt. Mushroom 
Co., 735 A.2d at 749. Similarly, Massachusetts law 
regulates bean sprout growing and processing as a food 
manufacturing facility and not as a farm . 
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of the line, i.e., wi the agricultural overt 
exemption, and post-harvest work in a 
processing ory li Chang's fall on the r . 
Cali rnia appellate courts have addressed a 
very similar issue of "line drawing" in agricultural 
labor and adopted an approach more in line wi the 
structure and purpose of the Massachusetts 
cul exemption. In Bains v. Dept. Ind. 
Rel., 244 Cal. App.4th 1120, 1122-23 (2016), the court 
held laborers on a working in xed 
structures like , s, ng prunes for market, are 
entitled to a higher overtime premium than workers who 
harvest the prunes from trees and transport them to 
drying structures . 
Bains rejected employer's argument - s lar 
to that advanced by Chang that proximity to 
harvesting deprives the fi structure wor s of 
higher overtime rate. Id. That court recognized two 
classes of workers. One was engaged in harvesting and 
transporti produce to the place of processing or 
distribution. . at 1124. These workers were not 
entitled to the higher pay rate . 
The other class workers, entit to the higher 
pay rate, included laborers whose job duties resemble 
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the Chang workers', i.e., workers engaged in "any 
operation rf ormed in a rmanently fixed structure 
. .. on the r the purpose of preparing 
agricultural products r market ... and include l 
rations incident thereto." Id. (emphasis added) 
ion to Californ Code of Regulations tted) . 7 
parti relevance is the Cali rnia s 
Court's conclusion that proximity to harvesting was 
not squali ng. r, dividi line is 
whether, on one hand, a worker is engaged in 
rvesting or, on other, as here, "is engaged in 
any operation in a permanently xed structure" to 
prepare agricultural products for market all 
operation incidental thereto." Id . 
The Bains court drew a l that limited 
scope of the California cultural exemption 
consistent with that statute's overall remedial 
Bains has been superseded by passage of AB 1066, the 
Phase-in Overtime for icultural Workers Act of 2016. 
That slation, among other things, phases in overtime 
wages for all agricultural workers after 40 hours of work 
in a week as well as for the first 8 hours on the seventh 
consecutive day of a workweek. The bill further requires 
double time after 12 hours of work in one day. The overtime 
and double time rates will be phased in over a four-year 
per a provision that alters Wage Order No. 14, which 
now des overtime after 10 hours of work in a day and 
60 hours per week . 
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purpose. This court, in construi § 1A(19), should do 
no less . 
D. trial court's overbroad reading of the 
Massachusetts agricultural overtime 
exemption exposes a vulnerable sector of the 
Commonwealth's workforce to exploitation . 
The Chang workers belong to a r force that is 
part of the U.S. food system, nation's largest 
source of employment, whi empl 21.5 million 
wor rs. Massachusetts employed 15,000-plus workers 
the cultural sector with a hired farm payroll of 
$161,366,000 in 2012. Snapshot of Massachusetts 
Agriculture, www.mass.gov/fi s/documents/2016/08 
/rf/s shot-of-ma-ag-presentat .pdf (last accessed 
6-20-2018. The western counties of the 
Commonwealth employ approximately 5000 farm laborers 
whose yearly s total approximately $41.5 million, 
around $8,305 per worker yearly. See id . 
In the five key sectors the system -
production, processing, stribution, retail, and 
service poor working conditions, low average 
wages, abus practices, and scr ion are 
commonplace . Chain Workers liance and 
Solidarity Research Cooperative, No ece of the Pie: 
U.S. Food Workers in 2016, 5 (2016), http://solidarity 
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research.org/wpcontent oads/ 2017/06/FCWA 
NoPieceOfThePie_W.pdf. (last access 10-14 18) . 
Immigrants comprise 18 per cent of all workers engaged 
in the core food occupations and indust s, according 
to the U.S. Census Bureau. Food Cha Workers 
Alliance, The Hands That Feed Us: Challenges and 
Opport ties Workers Along e Food Chain, 34 
(2012)' ://foodchainworkers.org/wpcontent/uploads 
/2012/06/Hands-That-Feed-Us .pdf (last accessed 
10-14-2018). The potential for oitive treatment of 
workers in this sector is not seriously in spute . 
Since 2000, employment in the food chain economy 
has grown at a rate more than double that of all r 
industries. Id. at 5. Food chain employers their 
workers the lowest hou y median wage of all 
indust s, $10 hour. The me wage across all 
U.S. indus s is $17.53 hour. Id. at 14. Well 
over a third of the food chain workforce is non-white, 
and the majority of food industry jobs pay wages low 
the pove level. . at 21, 23. 
The $8.50 hourly wage paid by Chang is 
significantly below the national an hourly wage of 
$13 per hour in food processing. No ece of Pie: 
U.S. Food Workers in 2016 at 15. Given ir 
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substandard wages, it is not surprising that the Chang 
employees, like more than 40 per cent of the food 
industry workforce, routinely work for more than 40 
hours per week to make ends meet. The Hands That Feed 
Us: Challenges and Opportunities for Workers Along the 
Food Chain at 24. Notably, most of these workers, 
unlike the Change employees, receive overtime . 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the Superior Court's 
summary judgment ruling for the employer and find, as 
a matter of law, that the Chang workers are not exempt 
agricultural laborers under Section 1A(19) of Chapter 
151 of the General Laws . 
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M.G.L.A. 94 § 305C 
§ 30 . Food processor or distributor licensing; 
ication of section 
The department shall issue and may renew on an annual 
basis a license to every rson engaged in the 
business of processing or distributing food for sale 
at wholes including every person who prepares, 
manufactures, packs, repacks, cans, bott s, keeps, 
exposes, stores, handles or stributes food or who 
operates a food warehouse. Said license requirement 
shall not apply to any person who is a purveyor of 
sh its and vegetables, a farmer who produces and 
sells raw farm products, including eggs, persons 
licensed under section ten B fort forty.=-eight A, 
s five H s or one hundred and or 
li under chapter one hundred and thirty-eight, 
persons holding a permit under chapter one hundred and 
irty, nor to any person who rates an 
establishment under the inspection of the meat 
inspection di vision of the bureau animal industry 
of United States department of agriculture . 
Said license shall apply to one place of bus ss 
only. Prior to issuing a license, department shall 
ct each place of bus ss for which application 
is made. The department shall send a copy of such 
license to the board of health of the ty or town in 
which licensee is located . 
The fee for each license and for each annual renewal 
thereof shall be determined annually by the 
commissioner of administration under the provisions of 
section three B of chapter seven . 
No person 11 carry on bus ss of a food 
processor or food distributor unless such person holds 
a valid license from department. Any person who 
violates the provisions of this section shall be 
punished by a ne of not more than one thousand 
dol The superior court shall have juris 
enjoin any ation of this ragraph or to such 
other action as equity and jus ce may re . 
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Subject to the irements of chapter rty A, 
department may re e to issue or renew, suspend or 
such license if (1) any statement in 
license application or upon which license was 
issued is dete ned to be false or sleading; (2) 
the applicant or licensee has been convicted of a 
crime relating to processing, st 
stribution or sa of food in connection with 
sed business; (3) the applicant or licensee has 
fai to comp with any applicable provision of this 
chapter or any applicable rule or regulations; or (4), 
the applicant or l refuses to admit 
sentatives of the rtment at any reasonable 
for purposes of inspection. The commissioner may, 
without a or hearing, suspend a license if finds 
that such licensee is operating his business in a 
manner which is endangering or may cause imminent 
danger to the public heal th. In of 
suspension of a license without a prior ng, 
licensee l be promptly afforded an opportunity for 
such hearing . 
The department may make such rules and ations as 
may be necessary the enforcement of this section . 
Such rules and regulations may provide administrat 
penalties for the violation of any or regulation 
promulgated hereunder not to exceed five hundred 
dollars any single olation . 
Credits 
Added by St.1956, c. 663, § 2. Amended by St.1970, c. 
8 91 , § 7 ; st . 1 9 8 7 , c . 7 5 7 ,_JLl . 
M.G.L.A. 94 § 305C, MA ST 94 § 305C 
Current through Chapter 108 of the 2018 2nd Annual 
Session 
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M.G.L.A. 128 § lA 
§ lA. Farming, agriculture, farmer; de tions 
"Farming" or "agriculture" shall include ng in 
all of its branches the cultivation and tillage of 
the s 1, dairying, the production, cult ion, 
growing and harvesting of any icultural, 
aquacultural, ricultural or horticultural 
commodities, the growing and harvesting of forest 
products upon forest land, rais of livestock 
including horses, keeping of horses as a 
commercial enterprise, the ing and raising of 
poultry, swine, cattle other domesticated ls 
used for purposes, s, fur-bearing animals, and 
any forestry or lumbering operations, performed by a 
farmer, who is hereby de as one engaged in 
agri ture or farming as here defined, or on a farm 
as an incident to or in conjunct with such farming 
operations, including preparations market, 
delivery to sto or to market or to carriers 
transportat to market . 
Credits 
Added by St.1952, c. 386. Amended by St.1960, c. 181; 
St.1987, c. 253; St.1989, c. 225; St.1995, c. 38, § 
142. 
M.G.L.A. 128 § lA, MA ST 128 § lA 
Current through Chapter 108 of the 2018 2nd Annual 
Sess 
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§ 1. Oppress 
M.G.L.A. 151 § 1 
and unreasonable wages; 
contracts 
Effect : January 1, 2017 
idity of 
It is hereby declared to be against public policy 
any employer to employ any person an occupation 
this commonwealth at an oppressive and unreasonable 
wage as de in section two and any contract, 
agreement or rs for or in relation to such 
employment shall be null and void. A wage of less than 
$11.00 per hour, in any occupation, as de in 
chapter, 11 conclus be presumed to 
oppressive and unreasonable, wherever term 
"minimum wage" is us in s chapter, unless the 
commissioner expressly approved or s 11 expressly 
rove the establishment and payment of a lesser wage 
under the provisions of sections seven and 
No thstanding the provisions of s section, in no 
case shall minimum wage rate be less $. 50 
higher than effe fede minimum rate . 
Credits 
Added St.1947, c. 432, § 1. Amended by St.1949, c . 
777, § 1; St.1952, c. 558, § 1; St.1955, c. 762, § 1; 
St.1956, c. 740, § 1; St.1958, c. 620, § 1; St.1962, 
c. 134, 1, 4; St.1964, c. 644, 1, 4; St.1966, c. 
679, §§ 1, 4; St.1971, c. 892, § 1; St.1972, c. 752, § 
1; St.1973, c. 1192, § 4; St.1974, c. 685, 1, 2; 
St.1977, c. 946, §§ 1 to 4; St.1985, c. 760, 1 to 
3; St.1990, c. 306, § 1; St.1995 c. 196 §§ 1 2; 
~-----------··~----~---.. -----
St~ 1999, c. 47, 1 to 3; St.200?, c. 271, § 1, ef!_._ 
Jan. 1 2007; St.2006 c. 271 § 2 eff. Jan. 1 2008; 
St.2014 144 28 31 eff. 1 2015; 
St. , § 4' c. 
---------------------·~ ---- -----------------------
144, § 30, eff. Jan. 1, 
M.G.L.A. 151 § 1, MA ST 151 § 1 
Current through Chapter 108 of the 2018 2nd Annual 
Session 
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M.G.L.A. 151 § lA 
§ lA. Overtime pay; excluded employments 
Effective: November 26, 2003 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no 
employer in the commonwealth shall employ any of his 
employees in an occupation, as defined in section two, 
for a work week longer than forty hours, unless such 
employee receives compensation for his employment in 
excess of forty hours at a rate not less than one and 
one half times the regular rate at which he is 
employed. Sums paid as commissions, drawing accounts, 
bonuses, or other incentive pay based on sales or 
production, shall be excluded in computing the regular 
rate and the overtime rate of compensation under the 
provisions of this section. In any work week in which 
an employee of a retail business is employed on a 
Sunday or certain holidays at a rate of one and one-
half times the regular rate of compensation at which 
he is employed as provided in chapter 136, the hours 
so worked on Sunday or certain holidays shall be 
excluded from the calculation of overtime pay as 
required by this section, unless a collectively 
bargained labor agreement provides otherwise. Except 
as otherwise provided in the second sentence, nothing 
in this section shall be construed to otherwise limit 
an employee's right to receive one and one-half times 
the regular rate of compensation for an employee on 
Sundays or certain holidays or to limit the voluntary 
nature of work on Sundays or certain holidays, as 
provided for in said chapter 136 . 
This section shall not be applicable to any employee 
who is employed:--
(1) as a janitor or caretaker of residential property, 
who when furnished with living quarters is paid a wage 
of not less than thirty dollars per week . 
(2) as a golf caddy, 
performer . 
newsboy or child actor or 
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(3) as a bona fide 
professional person 
position earning more 
executive, or administrative or 
or qualified trainee for such 
than eighty dollars per week . 
(4) as an outside salesman or outside buyer . 
(5) as a learner, apprentice or handicapped person 
under a special license as provided in section nine . 
( 6) as a fisherman or as a person employed in the 
catching or taking of any kind of fish, shellfish or 
other aquatic forms of animal and vegetable life . 
( 7) as a switchboard operator in a public telephone 
exchange . 
( 8) as a driver or helper on a truck with respect to 
whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to 
establish qualifications and maximum hours of service 
pursuant to the provisions of section two hundred and 
four of the motor carrier act of nineteen hundred and 
thirty-five,~ or as employee of an employer subject to 
the provisions of Part 1 of the Interstate Commerce 
Act~ or subject to title II of the Railway Labor Act.~ 
(9) in a business or specified operation of a business 
which is carried on during a period or accumulated 
periods not in excess of one hundred and twenty days 
in any year, and determined by the commissioner to be 
seasonal in nature . 
(10) as a seaman . 
(11) by an employer licensed and regulated pursuant to 
chapter one hundred and fifty-nine A . 
(12) in a hotel, 
establishment . 
motel, 
(13) in a gasoline station . 
43 
motor court or like 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
(14) in a restaurant . 
(15) as a garageman, which term shall not include a 
parking lot attendant . 
(16) in a 
nursing home, 
for the aged . 
hospital, 
infirmary, 
sani tori um, convalescent or 
rest home or charitable home 
(17) in a non-profit school or college . 
(18) in a summer camp operated by a non-profit 
charitable corporation . 
( 19) as a laborer engaged in agriculture and farming 
on a farm . 
(20) in an amusement park containing 
aggregation of amusement devices, games, 
other attractions operated during a 
accumulated periods not in excess of one 










M.G.L.A. 151 § 2 
§ 2. Defini ons 
E ctive: July 1, 2017 
words and phrases 
following 
ires otherwise: 
as used in 
ngs, unless 
"A fair wage", 
commensurate wi 
a wage fairly and reasonably 
value of se ce or class of 
se ce rendered. In establishing a nimum fair 
ass of service under this 
commissioner being bound by any techni 
ru s of evidence or procedure (1) may take 
account the cost of living and l other relevant 
circumstances ing the va of the service or 
s of service rendered, (2) may guided by li 
considerations as would guide a court in a suit 
reasonable of se ces rendered 
s ces are the request of an employer 
absence of an express contract as to the amount of 
wage to be and ( 3) may consider the 
in the commonweal th for work of like 
comparable r by employers who vo 
minimum r wage standards . 
"A mandatory 
is subject to 
2 of section n 
an order 
penal ties pres 






both less than 
se ces rendered 
unreasonable 
fair and re as 
less than suf f 
necessary 
a wage whi is 
value of the 
meet 
imum cost 1 
"Commissioner", the director of department of 
1 standards . 
"Department", department of labor standards. 
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"Occupation", an industry, trade or business or branch 
thereof or class of work therein, whether operated for 
profit or otherwise, and any other class of work in 
which persons are gainfully employed, but shall not 
include professional service, agricultural and farm 
work, work by persons being rehabilitated or trained 
under rehabilitation or training programs in 
charitable, educational or religious institutions, 
work by seasonal camp counselors and counselor 
trainees or work by members of religious orders . 
Occupation shall also not include outside sales work 
regularly perf armed by outside salesmen who regularly 
sell a product or products away from their employer's 
place of business and who do not make daily reports or 
visits to the office or plant of their employer . 
"Agricultural and farm work", labor on a farm and the 
growing and harvesting of agricultural, floricul tural 
and horticultural commodities . 
Credits 
Added by St.1947, c. 432, § 1. Amended by St.1948, c . 
362; St.1952, c. 558, §§ 2, 3; St.1954, c. 174; 
St.1959, c. 190; St.1967, c. 718, §§ 2, 2A; St.1970, 
c. 760, § 13; St.1973, c. 1192, § 5; St.1981, c. 351, 
§ 240; St.1996, c. 151, §§ 439 to 441; St.2003, c. 26, 
§§ 577, 578, eff. July 1, 2003; St.2011, c. 3, § 144, 
eff. Mar. 27, 2011; St.2017, c. 47, § 68, eff. July 1, 
2017 . 
M.G.L.A. 151 § 2, MA ST 151 § 2 
Current through Chapter 108 of the 2018 2nd Annual 
Session 
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29 U.S.C.A. § 203(f) 
§ 203. Definitions 
Effective: March 23, 2018 
As used in this chapter--
(f) "Agriculture" includes farming in all its 
branches and among other things includes the 
cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the 
production, cul ti vat ion, growing, and harvesting of 
any agricultural or horticultural commodities 
(including commodities defined as agricultural 
commodities in section 1141j (g) of Title 12), the 
raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals, or 
poultry, and any practices (including any forestry or 
lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a 
farm as an incident to or in conj unction with such 
farming operations, including preparation for market, 
delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for 
transportation to market . 
29 U.S.C.A. § 203, 29 USCA § 203 
Current through P.L. 115-188. Also includes P.L. 115-
190, 115-191, and 115-193. Title 26 current through 
P.L. 115-193 . 
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29 U.S.C.A. § 207 
§ 207. Maximum 
Ef ctive: March 23, 2010 
(a) Employees engaged in interstate commerce; 
tional appli lity to pursuant to 
subsequent amendatory provisions 
(1) Except as se provided s section, no 
shall any of his oyees who in 
workweek is commerce or in the production 
goods for commerce, or is empl in an ente 
in commerce or in the production of goods 
commerce, for a workweek longer forty hours 
unless such empl receives ation for his 
loyment in excess of the hours specified at a 
rate not less one and one f times the regu 
rate at which he is employed . 
(2) No employer l employ any of s employees who 
in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in 
ion of goods r commerce, or is employed in an 
se engaged in commerce or the production of 
goods for commerce, and who in such workweek is 
brought within purview of s subsection by 
amendments made to this chapter the Fair 
Standards Amendments of 1966--
(A) for a wo 
ng the first 
longer four 
from the effective date 
Fair Labor S Amendments 1966, 
(B) for a workweek longer than two hours du ng 
second year such date, or 
(C) for a workweek longer than hours a 
ration of second year such date, 
such employee receives sation for 
oyment in excess of the hours above speci 
a rate not ss than one and one-half times 
lar rate at ch he is employed . 
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29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a) 
§ 213. Exemptions 
Effective: March 23, 2018 
(a) Minimum wage and maximum hour requirements 
The provisions of sections 206 (except subsection (d) 
in the case of paragraph ( 1) of this subsection) and 
207 of this title shall not apply with respect to--
(6) any employee employed in agriculture (A) if such 
employee is employed by an employer who did not, 
during any calendar quarter during the preceding 
calendar year, use more than five hundred man-days of 
agricultural labor, (B) if such employee is the 
parent, spouse, child, or other member of his 
employer's immediate family, (C) if such employee (i) 
is employed as a hand harvest laborer and is paid on 
a piece rate basis in an operation which has been, 
and is customarily and generally recognized as having 
been, paid on a piece rate basis in the region of 
employment, (ii) commutes daily from his permanent 
residence to the farm on which he is so employed, and 
(iii) has been employed in agriculture less than 
thirteen weeks during the preceding calendar year, 
(D) if such employee (other than an employee 
described in clause (C) of this subsection) (i) is 
sixteen years of age or under and is employed as a 
hand harvest laborer, is paid on a piece rate basis 
in an operation which has been, and is customarily 
and generally recognized as having been, paid on a 
piece rate basis in the region of employment, (ii) is 
employed on the same farm as his parent or person 
standing in the place of his parent, and (iii) is 
paid at the same piece rate as employees over age 
sixteen are paid on the same farm, or (E) if such 
employee is principally engaged in the range 
production of livestock; 
29 U.S.C.A. § 213, 29 USCA § 213 
Current through P.L. 115-188. Also includes P.L. 115-
190, 115-191, and 115-193. Title 26 current through 
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P.L. 115-193 
43 P.S. § 25-1 
§ 25-1. Definitions 
The term "establishment" shall mean any room, building 
or place within this Commonweal th where persons are 
employed or permitted to work for compensation of any 
kind to whomever payable, except farms or private 
dwellings, and shall include those owned or under the 
control of the Commonweal th, and any political 
subdivision thereof, as well as school districts . 
The term "department" shall mean the Department of 
Labor and Industry . 
Credits 
1 9 3 7 , May 18 , P . L . 6 5 4 , No . 1 7 4 , § 1 . 
43 P.S. § 25-1, PA ST 43 P.S. § 25-1 
Current through 2018 Regular Session Acts 1 to 27 and 
31 
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105 CMR 420.001 
420.001: Purpose 
105 CMR 420.000 is intended to protect the health, 
safety and well-being of occupants of farm labor camps 
and to promote the general welfare . 
The Massachusetts Administrative Code titles are 
current through Register No. 1367, dated June 15, 2018 
Mass. Regs. Code tit. 105, § 420.001, 105 MA ADC 
420.001 
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780 CMR 302 
302 
302.6 through 302.10.1.3 Add the following sections 
and subsections as follows: 
302.6 Masonry Parapets. The following exception 
applies to requirements in 780 CMR 34.00 for masonry 
parapets: 
Exception: If the height-to-thickness ratio of an 
unbraced unreinforced masonry parapet does not 
exceed 2.5, then bracing is not required. For the 
purpose of this exception, the height shall be 
measured from either the level of tension anchors 
or the roof sheathing, whichever is lower . 
302.7 Structural Requirements Pertaining to Roofing 
Work . 
1. Structural requirements of parapets of unreinforced 
masonry required by sections 403.5 and 707.3.1 of 780 
CMR 34. 00 shall only apply when the intended 
alteration requires a permit for reroofing and when 
roof covering is removed from the entire roof 
diaphragm and not by the 25% roof area trigger found 
in sections 403.5 and 707.3.1 of 780 CMR 34.00 . 
2. Structural requirements of roof diaphragms 
resisting wind loads in high-wind regions required by 
sections 403.8 and 707.3.2 of 780 CMR 34.00, when the 
intended alteration requires a permit for reroofing, 
shall only apply when roof covering is removed from 
the entire roof diaphragm and the building is located 
where the ultimate design wind speed is greater than 
150 mph and the building is Risk Category IV in 
accordance with Table 1604.5 of 780 CMR . 
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302. 8 Structural Requirements Pertaining to Major 
Alterations . 
1. Structural requirements required by sections 403. 6 
and 907.4.5 of 780 CMR 34.00 for unreinforced masonry 
walls shall apply to buildings in seismic design 
category B in addition to categories C, D, E, and F 
found in these sections and shall require roof and 
floor levels to be anchored to the walls . 
2. Structural requirements required by sections 403. 7 
and 907.4.6 of 780 CMR 34.00 for unreinforced masonry 
parapets shall apply to buildings in seismic design 
category B in addition to categories C, D, E, and F 
found in these sections . 
302 . 9 Provisions for Change in Occupancy 
Classification to R, I, or E-Use. Notwithstanding 
other requirements in 780 CMR 34.00, see 780 CMR 
9.00: Fire Protection Systems and applicable 
provisions of 527 CMR: Board of Fire Prevention 
Regulations for certain carbon monoxide detection 
requirements when a change of occupancy 
classification to R, I, or E-Use occurs . 
302.10 Fire Detection Systems in R-2 Uses Which Are 
Not Currently Equipped with Sprinklers. When 780 CMR 
34. 00 requires a smoke detection system in an R-2 
Use and does not additionally require an NFPA 13, 
13R, or 13D system installed throughout the 
building, then subsections 302.10.1 through 302.10.3 
shall apply . 
302.10.1 Heat Detection. If a building fire alarm 
system is provided, a heat detector shall be 
provided inside each dwelling unit within six feet 
of the entrance door. The heat detectors shall be 
connected to the building fire alarm system and 
cause a general alarm throughout the building upon 
activation. This shall also apply to the R-2 Use 
of a mixed use building . 
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Exception: Buildings containing three units or 
fewer and not provided with a building fire alarm 
system that comply with 302.10.3.1 . 
302.10.2 Common Area Detection. If a building fire 
alarm system is provided, smoke detectors shall be 
provided in the common areas of the building. The 
common area detectors shall be connected to the 
building fire alarm system and cause a general 
alarm throughout the building upon activation. 
This shall also apply to the R-2 Use of a mixed 
use building . 
Exception: Buildings containing three units or 
fewer and not provided with a building fire alarm 
system that comply with 302.10.3.1 . 
302.10.3 Dwelling Unit Detection. Interconnected 
dwelling unit smoke detection shall sound within 
that dwelling unit only . 
Exception: For buildings of three stories or 
fewer used exclusively as R-2 Use with six or 
fewer dwelling units and with at least two means 
of egress serving each dwelling unit, the fire 
detection system may comply with the all of the 
following requirements: 
1. Interconnected dwelling unit smoke detection shall 
sound within that dwelling unit only . 
2. Area smoke detection shall be provided throughout 
common uses spaces, including shared means of egress . 
3. A heat detector shall be provided inside each 
dwelling unit within six feet of doors serving common 
areas . 
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Upon activation of either the common area smoke 
detection or the heat detection, a general alarm 
shall be sounded throughout the building . 
302.10.3.1 Buildings with Three Dwelling Units or 
Fewer. In buildings containing three units or 
fewer, which are not protected with sprinklers 
and which are not provided with a building fire 
alarm system, each dwelling unit shall have 
additional interconnected smoke detectors on the 
stairway side of all doors leading to common 
interior stairways. If there is a common 
basement, a separate interconnected system of 
smoke detectors, including smoke detectors on the 
stairway side of all doors leading to interior 
stairways, shall be provided to serve the 
basement level only . 
The Massachusetts Administrative Code titles are 
current through Register No. 1367, dated June 15, 2018 
Mass. Regs. Code tit. 780, § 302, 780 MA ADC 302 
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29 C.F.R. § 780.128 
§ 780.128 General statement on "secondary" 
agriculture . 
The discussion in §§ 780 .106 through 780 .127 relates 
to the direct farming operations which come within the 
"primary" meaning of the def ini ti on of "agriculture." 
As defined in section 3 (f) "agriculture" includes not 
only the farming activities described in the "primary" 
meaning but also includes, in its "secondary" meaning, 
"any practices (including any forestry or lumbering 
operations) performed by a farmer or on a farm as an 
incident to or in conjunction with such farming 
operations, including preparation for market delivery 
to storage or to market or to carriers for 
transportation to market." The legislative history 
makes it plain that this language was particularly 
included to make certain that independent contractors 
such as threshers of wheat, who travel around from 
farm to farm to assist farmers in what is recognized 
as a purely agricultural task and also to assist a 
farmer in getting his agricultural goods to market in 
their raw or natural state, should be included within 
the definition of agricultural employees (see Bowie v . 
Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11; 81 Cong. Rec. 7876, 7888) . 
SOURCE: 37 FR 12084, June 17, 1972; 73 FR 77238, Dec . 
1 8 , 2 0 0 8 ; 7 4 FR 2 6 0 14 , May 2 9 , 2 0 0 9 ; 7 6 FR 1 8 8 5 9 , 




Secs. 1-19, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 75 
29 U.S.C. 201-219. Pub.L. 105-78, 111 Stat. 
Current through June 22, 2018; 83 FR 29209 . 
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29 C.F.R. § 780.129 
§ 780.129 Required relationship of practices to 
farming operations . 
To come within this secondary meaning, a practice must 
be performed either by a farmer or on a farm. It must 
also be performed either in connection with the 
farmer's own farming operations or in connection with 
farming operations conducted on the farm where the 
practice is performed. In addition, the practice must 
be performed "as an incident to or in conjunction 
with" the farming operations. No matter how closely 
related it may be to farming operations, a practice 
performed neither by a farmer nor on a farm is not 
within the scope of the "secondary" meaning of 
"agriculture." Thus, employees employed by commission 
brokers in the typical activities conducted at their 
establishments, warehouse employees at the typical 
tobacco warehouses, shop employees of an employer 
engaged in the business of servicing machinery and 
equipment for farmers, plant employees of a company 
dealing in eggs or poultry produced by others, 
employees of an irrigation company engaged in the 
general distribution of water to farmers, and other 
employees similarly situated do not generally come 
within the secondary meaning of "agriculture." The 
inclusion of industrial operations is not within the 
intent of the definition in section 3(f), nor are 
processes that are more akin to manufacturing than to 
agriculture (see Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11; 
Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d 52; 
Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398; 
Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254; Mitchell v. Budd, 350 
U.S. 473) . 
SOURCE: 37 FR 12084, June 17, 1972; 73 FR 77238, Dec . 
1 8 , 2 0 0 8 ; 7 4 FR 2 6 0 14 , May 2 9 , 2 0 0 9 ; 7 6 FR 1 8 8 5 9 , 
April 5, 2011, unless otherwise noted . 
AUTHORITY: Secs. 1-19, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 75 
Stat. 65; 29 U.S.C. 201-219. Pub.L. 105-78, 111 Stat . 
1467. Current through June 22, 2018; 83 FR 29209 . 
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